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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

December	Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963.
1 Dec	Assassination of KIROV, CPSU leader in Leningrad, gives Stalin pretext to start great purge, 1934.
5 Dec	USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing for universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, 1936.
9 Dec	WFDY executive committee meeting, Djakarta, Dec. 9-15.
21 Dec	Stalin born (1879).
26 Dec	Mao Tse-tung born (1893 - 70 years).
January	International Conference of Youth and Students for Disarmament (WFDY-sponsored); scheduled for Florence, Italy, January 1964.
2 Jan	Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959.
15 Jan	"Trial of the 12" first show trial of Stalinist purge, including Zinoviev and Kamenev (initial members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline), 1935.
21 Jan	Lenin dies, 1924 (born 22 April 1870).
26 Jan	Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.
31 Jan	Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929.
31 Jan	Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from participation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers American Republics at Punta del Este, 1962.
1 Feb	UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, 1951.
2 Feb	Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty signed: Soviet Government "forever renounces sovereign rights over people and territory of Estonia," 1920.
14 Feb	USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950.
14 Feb	Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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

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SECRET

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#16 28 October-8 November 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese fired another major blast at the Soviets, a 10,000-word People's Daily editorial on 2 November, "The Truth About How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India Against China," in reply to the 19 September Pravda editorial on the subject. They bluntly accused the Soviet leadership of conjuring up Sino-Indian tension in order to exploit the boundary issue to sow dissension between China and Asian-African countries. The highly tendentious version of the "facts" of the dispute and the chronology of Sino-Soviet relations regarding it strikingly illustrate the ultra-nationalistic sense of self-righteousness which characterizes the Chinese outlook. The Chinese taunt the Soviets with phrases such as "munitions merchants" and "running a joint stock company with the US imperialists," brand Soviet statements as "ludicrous" and "a plain lie," and warn: "The Soviet leaders have betrayed the revolutionary cause of the Indian people; this account will be settled sooner or later." The editorial concludes by asserting that the Soviets no longer consider the imperialists to be their enemy: now it is "the Marxist-Leninists, ... and China in particular." In a classic "pot-calling-kettle-black" final paragraph, the Chinese charge: "Your Achilles heel is your lack of respect for truth.... Those who have no respect for truth will fail in the end!"

The Chinese press also carried two full pages (31 Oct. - 1 Nov.) of extracts from recent Soviet attacks on China with a shrill editorial comment on the Soviet campaign (which has included 430 items from 1 September to 27 October, for a total of 716 since 15 July!)

2. The only other major polemical tract of the period was also on the Chinese side, a 16,000-word North Korean Nodong Sinmun editorial on 28 October, "Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp," which effectively -- and relatively dispassionately -- argued the Chinese case as applied to a smaller nation. It began by exhorting all Communists not to join in any Soviet move to isolate the Chinese, -- and ended by calling on all to isolate the revisionists.

3. The Soviet Party, engrossed in the celebration of the 46th anniversary of its "October Revolution" on 7 November (and perhaps reacting to the refusal of a number of pro-Soviet parties to join in a move to isolate the Chinese, see below), contributed very little to the war of words, beyond the replay of a few supporting statements by representatives of relatively

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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unimportant parties (Colombia, Portugal, U.S.A.). The anniversary celebration accentuated the positive -- i.e., fraternal friendship and mutual assistance -- in all messages and speeches, with the conflict ignored or dismissed optimistically (except for the Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans).

4. The latest public references to the prospect of a conference of all parties coming to our attention -- on both sides (Rumanian, E. German, and New Zealand) -- emphasized the necessity for careful preparations, inferentially over a long period of time. There has been no information regarding possible discussions in Moscow at the time of the celebration.

5. A Japanese CP resolution pegged to the general elections not only outlined an "independent" line in full harmony with the Chinese -- but went on to define "modern dogmatism" in such a way as to apply it implicitly against the CPSU and the Soviet-aligned bloc.

Significance:

Despite the enormously favorable conditions provided by the 46th anniversary of the "October Revolution," celebrated by all Communists as the greatest step in the development of world Communism, with pilgrimages to Moscow by representatives of all major parties, the Soviets seemed to lose the initiative in the conflict to the Chinese side during this period. Certainly the battle of polemics was pushed vigorously only by the Chinese side, and the bulk of available evidence indicates that the Soviets have given up -- in the face of lack of support by important parties -- their effort to call an early conference of the parties to force the Chinese into self-excommunication. However, the picture is far from clear and it seems possible that the Soviets are marking time pending the outcome of inter-party discussions now going on in Moscow.

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

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#16

26 October-8 November 1963

October 22 - The Japanese CP, in a CC plenum resolution on "The Present Situation and the Party's Tasks Centering on the General Elections" (not picked up in time for last issue of Chronology), acknowledges the repercussions in Japan of the "bitter disputes over the divergence of view on basic principles in the international Communist movement" and establishes an "independent" line which is in full harmony with the Chinese. Calling for "struggle against modern revisionism, which is the primary danger as was pointed out by the Moscow statement," and also "fight against modern dogmatism, which has the characteristic of arbitrarily giving the general policy line for other fraternal parties, and also of blindly following the policies of other fraternal parties," the JCP implicitly turns the label of "modern dogmatism" as well as "modern revisionism" against the CPSU and the Soviet-aligned bloc. (Akahata) (E.g. the "follow other parties blindly" passage in the 28 October Nodong Sinmun editorial reviewed below, section 3).

October 27 - Peking press features the above JCP resolution; extensive quotes from an attack on the Tito reactionary revisionists in the Hanoi organ Nhan Dan (10 October?); and a 23 October statement by M. H. Williams, National Committee Chairman of the New Zealand CP stressing the CPNZ's "considered opinion that any meeting of the world parties without adequate preparations in conformity with the statement of the 81 parties ... would be premature, and would almost certainly be abortive."

October 28 - People's Daily uses extensive extracts from the 20,000-word Albanian ZIP attack on Khrushchev described in Chrono, October 4. (Pravda on 1 November indignantly reports Peking publication of ZIP attack.)

Leading East German propagandist Gerhard Eisler, Chairman of the State Radio Committee, answers the letter of a listener who refers to FCP boss Thorez's call for an international Communist conference (Chrono, October 6): suggesting postponement, he says convocation of such a conference "naturally depends on whether such a conference holds any prospects for reducing or even removing the differences of opinion," and therefore "the parties must clarify their positions by mutual consultations."

October 28 - North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun features a 16,000-word editorial headed "Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp," which comprehensively presents the North Korean views on the conflict: -- essentially the Chinese position, somewhat tailored to represent a smaller nation. It exhorts all Communists not to be a part of any Soviet move to isolate the Chinese, defends the Chinese side of the main issues, and ends by calling on all to "revolutionize and unite," -- and to isolate all revisionists!

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

October 30 - Indonesian CP organ Harian Rakjat, in an editorial supporting Sukarno's "Youth Oath Day" speech, concludes in tune with the CCP: "It is no longer necessary to explain why a revolutionary line can strengthen the cause of Asia, Africa and Latin America and boost the emerging forces, because through such a revolutionary line all the anti-imperialist forces can be organized and deal heavy blows to imperialism."

October 30 - West German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine carries a dispatch from its Moscow correspondent reporting "unconfirmed rumors" that the Kremlin had received a Chinese invitation to resume their bilateral discussions in Peking. (To date, we have seen no other report of such a development.)

October 31 - The Soviet Congress of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions meeting in Moscow adopts a resolution which emphasizes that "Soviet trade unions angrily reject the clumsy and groundless attacks by the CCP leadership on the CPSU, the Soviet Government and our people."

People's Daily under the headline "Anti-China Outbursts in the Soviet Press Become More Nasty and Fantastic," devotes an entire page to extracts from recent Soviet press articles attacking China, announcing that more will appear on the next day. The "editor's note" comments that extracts of earlier attacks had been printed two months ago. "Since then, instead of exercising any restraint, the Soviet press has been attacking China in a more aggressive and disgusting manner."

According to incomplete statistics, attacks on the CCP between 1 September and 27 October in national newspapers and journals alone number 430. The 286 items published between 15 July and 31 August, brings the total to 716, not including Soviet press reprints of fraternal party attacks on the CCP.

The editor tells his readers that "Their abuses and lies mount higher and higher.... The language they use becomes still more foul and scurrilous." They "malign Comrade Mao Tse-tung" more wantonly than before, lash out at his Marxist-Leninist theories, China's line for building socialism, and China's foreign and domestic policies. Alleging that Chinese statesmen have a slogan "Down with the whites!" they "even use such names as 'the Peking renegades' and 'wild duelists,' and talk about 'the conscience of the Peking leaders being like sewage,' etc."

November 1 - People's Daily again publishes extracts from Soviet attacks, and prints the full text of the 29 September Djakarta speech by PKI Chairman Aidit (Chrono, September 29).

November 2 - Peking press publishes a 10,000-word People's Daily editorial entitled "The Truth About How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India Against China," replying to the 19 September Pravda editorial "A Serious Hotbed of Tension in Asia" (published by People's Daily on 25 September) and the 21 September Soviet Government statement on same subject. Within the framework of a transparently tendentious version of the "facts" of the Sino-Indian border dispute (facts "respected" by

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

"the Asian-African countries which maintain strict neutrality") the Chinese charge that the Soviet leaders (who "ignore the facts" and who "have degenerated so far as to flout elementary logic") are "sparing no efforts to sow discord" and "working even harder than the U.S. imperialists in supporting the Indian reactionaries." What is their "real aim in conjuring up tension?"

> "To be blunt, the Soviet leaders are doing so because they want to exploit the Sino-Soviet boundary question to sow dissension between China and other Asian-African countries, divert the people in Asia and Africa from the struggle against imperialism, and cover up the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and warlike activities. This is a betrayal of the anti-imperialist revolutionary cause of the people of Asia, and, indeed, of the whole world."

The article includes a 16-point resume of Sino-Soviet exchanges over the Sino-Indian border conflict; brands Soviet statements as ludicrous or just "a plain lie"; taunts the Soviets with phrases such as "munitions merchants" and "running a joint stock company with the U.S. imperialists"; accuses Soviet leaders of betraying the Indian people, warning that "this account will be settled sooner or later"; and finally charges them with using "international mass organizations" such as the World Congress of Women in Moscow and the AAPSO conference in Moshi to "try to break up the anti-imperialist united front."

The editorial concludes:

> "It is becoming clearer and clearer that the Soviet leaders no longer consider the imperialists headed by the United States and the reactionaries of all countries to be their enemy. It is the Marxist-Leninists, the revolutionary people, and China in particular who are their enemy....
>
> "We would like to advise the Soviet leaders not to rejoice too soon. Revolutionary China can never be isolated. The more brazenly you collaborate with all imperialists and reactionaries, the more you isolate yourselves. China cannot be discredited, for the truth is on China's side. Your Achilles heel is your lack of respect for truth. More than 90 percent of the people of the world heed the truth. ... Those who have no respect for truth will fail in the end."

All Chinese papers also carry an NCNA report on increased Soviet economic and military support to India in opposition to China: People's Daily captions this "The More Soviet Aid to India, the More Frantic Its Anti-China Campaign."

A Yugoslav Tanyug report from Peking on "the appearance of this latest extremely bitter anti-Soviet document" says that "Peking observers" have given it special attention as "one of the severest attacks against the Soviet leadership." Tanyug continues:

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

"It is held to have two main aims: on the domestic scene to further anti-Soviet activity in a matter which touches national sentiment; on the foreign scene, a fresh effort to discredit the Soviet Union among the newly liberated, underdeveloped, and still unliberated countries."

Tass reports from Bogota that the 29th plenary meeting of the Colombian CP "unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the splitting activities of the CCP leaders," which "have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism."

NCNA reports from Rangoon that "Burmese public leaders in their statements today sternly denounced the Indian Government's rejection of a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question." Quoted were: "Secretary General of the Burma National United Front Bo Mya Thwar"; "Member of the Politburo of the Burma United Workers Party U Ba Hla Aung"; and "Member of the Executive Committee of the All-Burma World Peace Committee U Aing Ze."

November 3 - Pravda carries an article by Portuguese CP Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal pegged to the Soviet Revolution anniversary which describes the "surprise and indignation" among Communists of all countries at the "anti-Soviet campaign... supported by the CCP leaders." However, he optimistically believes that the friendship of the fraternal peoples will be unbreakable.

The Chinese press carries an NCNA report from Brussels that "the Belgian Communists who uphold Marxism-Leninism have published a semi-monthly, The People's Voice." Two issues were put out in October.

November 4 - The Rumanian Party daily organ Scinteia publishes an article by Rumanian Council of Ministers Chairman and Politburo member Maurer (article also appeared more or less simultaneously in the October issue of theoretical journal Lupta de Clasa and the November issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism/ World Marxist Review) devoted to the 3rd anniversary of the Moscow 81-party conference which condemns polemical attacks, insults, and distortion of positions, and the imposition of the line or decisions of one party on others. Maurer goes on to state that the Rumanian party welcomes the CPSU's earlier proposal for cessation of polemics and "supports persistent, patient work to create the conditions for holding a new conference of Communist and workers parties so that the existing difference of views can be discussed among the leaderships of the parties."

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

November 5 - A Pravda article on the 46th anniversary by American Communist Henry Winston (a Negro) condemns those in Peking who "are trying to speak on behalf of the 'colored peoples,'" of the world, who "understand that such an approach by the Chinese leaders, which smells of racism from a long way off, is the purest demagogery intended to deceive the inhabitants of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Winston asserts that the Chinese "will not succeed in deceiving the peoples of the colored continents," who "have become convinced that it is precisely the Soviet Union that is the best friend of the oppressed peoples."

November 6 - A North Korean Nodong Sinmun article pegged to the 46th anniversary of the October Revolution, "Revolutionary Ideas of October -- Banner of Struggle for National Independence and Liberation," emphasizes the role of revolution. "Some people are spreading an absurd theory that today .. the main task of the national liberation struggle in colonies has shifted from a political problem to an economic one.... This will only serve the neocolonialist policy of the imperialists."

November 7 - The 46th anniversary of the Soviet "October" Revolution is celebrated throughout the Communist world as "the greatest revolution in the history of mankind" (Peking's words), with the usual meetings, speeches, messages and editorials. The emphasis was on the positive achievements of the Communist world flowing from that Revolution, and (with the exception of the Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans -- see below) the great dispute was generally ignored or glossed over. Even the People's Daily, which naturally introduced the Chinese revolution as "a continuation of the October Revolution," emphasized that the Chinese people "will always remain the most dependable brothers of the Soviet people. No matter what storm may break in the world and what incident the imperialists and reactionaries may provoke, they will never hesitate to unite and fight shoulder to shoulder with the great Soviet people."

Not so with the Albanians, however. Zeri I Popullit's editorial only paid tribute to the CPSU's achievements when "led by J. V. Stalin," while it repeats the usual Albanian condemnation of "the Khrushchev group" which is attempting "to darken the name and great work of J. V. Stalin in order to revise Marxism-Leninism"; which "is plunging ever deeper into the morass of opportunism"; which has betrayed the Soviet people, etc.; which is "brutally trampling on the revolutionary principles of the Moscow documents," etc. In North Korea, the Nodong Sinmun editorial verged on the polemical as it stressed that "the triumph of the October Revolution confirmed the complete victory of Lenin's theory on proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship and announced the final bankruptcy of the opportunism of the Second International which refused revolution and preached reformism."

In Yugoslavia, the weekly Komunist carries an article entitled "Yugoslav Reality and Chinese Policy" in reply to the 26 September Chinese People's Daily/Red Flag "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" The Chinese attacks on socialist Yugoslavia,

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5
it says, "uncover the untenability, irresponsibility, and harmfulness of the methods of Chinese 'polemics,' which even street brawlers would not deign to employ." The article again makes much of the fact that the Chinese once recognized Yugoslavia as socialist and since 1956 have reversed themselves despite Yugoslavia's further progress in strengthening socialist relations.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENTIONS COMMUNISTES

Numéro 16 — 26 octobre - 8 novembre 1963

22 octobre: Le PC japonais, dans une résolution du plénum du CC sur "La situation présente et les tâches du parti relatives aux élections générales" (information non parvenue à temps au cours de la dernière édition de la Chronologie), reconnait les répercussions au Japon "des disputes violentes au sujet des divergences d'opinion sur les principes fondamentaux du mouvement communiste international", et définit une ligne "indépendante", qui se trouve en pleine harmonie avec celle des Chinois. Faisant appel en faveur "d'une lutte contre le révisionnisme moderne qui est le danger principal ainsi que la déclaration de Moscou le soulignait", et en faveur également "d'une lutte contre le dogmatisme moderne, dont le trait est d'imposer arbitrairement une ligne de politique générale aux autres partis fraternels", ainsi que de suivre aveuglement les politiques d'autres partis fraternels", le PC japonais accuse implicitement de "dogmatisme moderne" et de "révisionnisme moderne" le PC de l'Union Soviétique et le bloc pro-soviétique. (Akahata). (Voir passage "suivre aveuglement les autres partis" qui se trouve dans l'éditorial du 18 octobre du Nodong Sinmun et examiné plus bas, section 3).

27 octobre: La presse de Pékin publie en manchette la résolution ci-dessus du PC japonais; nombreuses citations d'une attaque contre le révisionnisme réactionnaire de Tito à Hanoi dans le journal Nhan Dan (10 octobre ?); et une déclaration du 23 octobre de M. H. Williams, président du Comité national du PC néo-zélandais qui souligne que ce parti "était d'avis que toute convocation des partis mondiaux sans préparation suffisante conformément aux déclarations des 81 partis... serait prématurée, et serait presque certainement stérile".

28 octobre: Le Quotidien du peuple donne de nombreuses citations d'un article de 20 000 mots du ZIP albanais, attaquant Khrouchtchev, article mentionné dans la Chronologie du 4 octobre. (La Pravda du 1er novembre parle avec indignation de la reproduction par Pékin de l'attaque du ZIP).

Gerhard Eisler, propagandiste important de l'Allemagne de l'Est, président du Comité d'Etat de la radio, répond à la lettre d'un auditeur qui parle de l'appel fait par le chef du PC français Thorez en faveur d'une conférence communiste internationale (Chrono, 6 octobre): en suggérant un ajournement, il déclare que la convocation d'une telle conférence "dépend naturellement du fait de savoir si cette conférence possède des chances de réduire ou d'éliminer les différences d'opinion", et par conséquent "les partis doivent preciser leurs positions au moyen de consultations mutuelles".

28 octobre: Le quotidien du PC nord-coréen Nodong Sinmun publie un éditorial de 16 000 mots intitulé "Défendons le camp socialiste" qui présente l'ensemble des vues des Nord-Coréens concernant le conflit: essentiellement la position de la Chine, quelque peu remaniée pour représenter un petit pays. Elle exhorte tous les communistes de ne participer à aucun mouvement soviétique tendant à isoler les Chinois, à défendre le point de vue chinois sur les questions principales, et

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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termine par un appel à tous de "pratiquer la révolution et s'unir" -- et à isoler tous les révisionnistes!

30 octobre: L'organe du PC indonésien, Harian Rakjat, dans un éditorial approuvant le discours de Soukarno, "Journée du serment de la jeunesse", conclut à l'unisson avec le PC chinois: "Il n'est plus nécessaire d'expliquer pourquoi la ligne révolutionnaire peut renforcer la cause de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et de l'Amérique Latine, et de raviver les forces qui émergent, car à l'aide de cette politique révolutionnaire toutes les forces anti-impérialistes peuvent être organisées et peuvent porter des coups solides à l'impérialisme".

30 octobre: Le quotidien de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest Frankfurter Allgemeine publie un communiqué de son correspondant à Moscou mentionnant "des rumeurs non confirmées" que le Kremlin a reçu l'invitation des Chinois de reprendre leurs discussions bilatérales à Pékin. (A ce jour, nous n'avons vu aucun autre communiqué à ce sujet).

31 octobre: Le Congrès soviétique du CC des Syndicats professionnels se réunissant à Moscou a adopté une résolution qui souligne que "les syndicats soviétiques rejettent avec colère les attaques maladroites et non fondées des leaders du PC chinois contre le PC de l'Union Soviétique, contre le gouvernement soviétique et contre notre peuple".

Le Quotidien du peuple, sous le titre "Les explosions anti-chinoises dans la presse soviétique deviennent plus méchantes et plus fantastiques", consacre une page entière à des passages d'articles récents de la presse soviétique attaquant la Chine, et annonce que d'autres passages seraient publiés le jour suivant. Une "note de l'éditeur" commente que des passages d'attaques faites précédemment ont été publiés il y a deux mois. "Depuis lors, au lieu de faire preuve de modération la presse soviétique a attaqué la Chine d'une manière plus agressive et plus dégoûtante encore".

D'après des statistiques incomplètes, les attaques dirigées contre le PC chinois entre le 1er septembre et le 27 octobre dans les journaux et périodiques seulement se montent à 430. Les 286 articles publiés entre le 15 juillet et le 31 août amènent ce total à 716, sans compter les reproductions faites par la presse soviétique des attaques par les partis fraternels dirigées contre le PC chinois.

L'éditeur déclare à ses lecteurs que "leurs abus et leurs mensonges s'accumulent de plus en plus haut ... Les expressions qu'ils emploient deviennent de plus en plus grossières". Ils "attaquent le camarade Mao Tse-tung d'une manière plus impudente que par le passé, s'en prennent à ses théories marxistes-léninistes, à la politique chinoise pour construire le socialisme, et aux politiques intérieure et étrangères de la Chine. Prétendant que les hommes d'Etat chinois préconisent le slogan "Abat les Blancs!", ils ont "même recours à des expressions telles que 'renégats de Pékin', 'duellistes sauvages', et parlent de 'la conscience des leaders de Pékin qui est comme un égout', etc..."

1 novembre: Le Quotidien du peuple publie de nouveau des extraits contenant les attaques soviétiques et reproduit en entier le texte du discours fait le 29 septembre à Djakarta par le président du PC indonésien Aidit (Chrono, 29 septembre).

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

2 novembre: La presse de Pékin publie un éditorial de 10 000 mots du Quotidien du peuple intitulé "La vérité au sujet de la manière dont les leaders du PC de l'Union Soviétique se sont alliés avec l'Inde contre la Chine", en réponse à l'éditorial du 19 septembre de Pravda "Pépinière de tension en Asie", (reproduit dans le Quotidien du peuple le 25 septembre), ainsi que la déclaration du gouvernement soviétique du 21 septembre sur le même sujet. Dans le cadre d'une version clairement tendancieuse concernant "faits" de la dispute de frontière entre l'Inde et la Chine (faits "respectés" par les pays afro-asiatiques qui maintiennent une neutralite stricte"), les Chinois accusent les leaders soviétiques (qui "ignorent les faits" et qui ont "dégénéré au point de se moquer de la logique élémentaire"), "ne ménagent aucun effort pour semer la discorde" et "travaillent avec plus d'ardeur même que les impérialistes américains à soutenir les réactionnaires indiens". Quel est leur but réel à chercher à faire disparaître la tension?

> "Pour être francs, les leaders soviétiques le font car ils cherchent à exploiter la question de frontière sino-soviétique en vue de semer la dissention entre la Chine et les autres pays afro-asiatiques, de tourner le peuple en Asie et en Afrique de la lutte contre l'impérialisme, et de cacher les activités agressives et belliqueuses des impérialistes américains. Ceci est une trahison de la cause révolutionnaire anti-impérialiste du peuple de l'Asie, et certainement du monde tout entier".

L'article comporte un résumé en 16-point des échanges sino-soviétiques au sujet du conflit de frontière entre la Chine et l'Inde; déclare que les déclarations des Soviets sont grotesques ou "de simples mensonges"; attaque les Soviets à l'aide de phrases telles que "marchands de munitions" et "opèrent une société par actions commune avec les impérialistes américains"; accuse les leaders soviétiques de trahir le peuple indien, déclarant que "ce compte sera réglé tôt ou tard; et finalement les accuse de se servir "des organisations internationales de masse" telles que le Congrès mondial des femmes à Moscou et celui de l'Organisation de la solidarité des peuples afro-asiatiques à Moshi pour "tâcher de désagréger le front anti-impérialiste uni".

L'éditorial conclut:

> "Il devient de plus en plus clair que les leaders soviétiques ne considèrent plus en tant qu'ennemis les impérialistes avec les Etats-Unis à leur tête et les réactionnaires de tous les pays. Ce sont les marxistes-léninistes, les peuples révolutionnaires, et la Chine en particulier qui sont leurs ennemis...
>
> "Nous voudrions conseiller aux leaders soviétiques de ne pas se réjouir trop tôt. La Chine révolutionnaire ne pourra jamais être isolée. Plus sera impudente votre collaboration avec les impérialistes et les réactionnaires et plus vous vous isolerez vous-mêmes. La Chine ne peut être discréditée, car la vérité est du côté de la Chine. Votre talon d'Achilles est votre manque de respect envers la vérité. Plus de 90 pour-cent des peuples du monde s'inclinent devant la vérité... Ceux qui n'ont pas de respect pour la vérité subiront un échec à la fin".

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Tous les journaux chinois publient également un communiqué de l'Agence-presse La Chine nouvelle sur l'accroissement du soutien militaire et économique soviétique à l'Inde en opposition à la Chine: le Quotidien du peuple le publie sous le titre: "Plus il y a d'aide soviétique à l'Inde et plus la campagne anti-chinoise devient forcenée".

Un communiqué yougoslave dans le Tanyug émanant de Pékin sur "l'apparution du dernier document anti-soviétique d'une violence extrême" déclare que "les observateurs de Pékin" lui ont attribué une attention spéciale en tant que "l'une des attaques les plus violentes contre les leaders soviétiques". Le Tanyug poursuit:

> "On croit qu'il poursuit deux buts principaux: sur la scène locale, poursuivre l'activité anti-soviétique dans une question qui atteint le sentiment national; sur la scène étrangère, un nouvel effort tendant à discréditer l'Union Soviétique parmi les pays nouvellement libérés, sous-développés et parmi ceux qui ne sont pas encore libérés".

Tass communique de Bogota que la 29e réunion plénière du PC de la Colombie "a adopté unanimement une résolution qui condamne les activités destructives des leaders du PC chinois", qui "n'ont rien de commun avec le marxisme-léninisme".

L'Agence-presse Chine nouvelle fait savoir de Rangoon que "les leaders pubics birmans ont violemment dénoncé dans leur déclaration d'aujourd'hui le gouvernement de l'Inde pour avoir rejeté un réglement pacifique de la question de frontière sino-indienne". Se trouvaient mentionnés: "le secrétaire-général du Front national uni de la Birmanie Bo Mya Thwar"; "le membre du Politburo du Parti uni des travailleurs de la Birmanie, U Ba Hla Aung"; et "le membre du Comité exécutif du Comité pan-birman de la paix, U Aing Ze".

3 novembre: La Pravda publie un article du secrétaire-général du PC portugais Alvaro Cunhal, à l'occasion de la révolution soviétique, qui décrit "la surprise et l'indignation" des communistes de tous les pays au sujet de "la campagne anti-soviétique... conduite par les leaders du PC chinois". Cependant, il estime avec optimisme que l'amitié des peuples fraternels restera indestructible.

La presse chinoise reproduit un communiqué de l'Agence-presse "Chine nouvelle" émanant de Bruxelles selon lequel "les communistes belges qui soutiennent le marxisme-léninisme publient un journal paraissant deux fois par mois, la "Voix du peuple". Deux numéros ont paru au mois d'octobre.

4 novembre: Le quotidien du parti roumain Scinteia publie un article du président du Conseil des ministres roumain et membre du Politburo Maurer (cet article est paru aussi plus ou moins simultanément dans le numéro d'octobre du journal théorique Lupta de Clasa et dans le numéro de novembre des "Problèmes de la paix et du socialisme", revue marxiste mondiale) consacré au 3e anniversaire de la 81e Conférence du parti à Moscou, qui condamne les polémiques agressives, les insultes, les déformations de positions et l'imposition de la ligne ou des décisions d'un parti aux autres partis. Maurer va jusqu'à déclarer

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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

que le parti roumain acceuille la proposition faite à une date antérieure par le PC de l'Union Soviétique de cesser les polémiques et "approuve le travail persistant et patient de créer les conditions pour organiser une nouvelle conférence des partis de travailleurs et de communistes afin de permettre de discuter des divergences de vues qui existent entre les leaders de ces partis."

5 novembre: Un article de Pravda sur le 46e anniversaire par un communiste américain Henry Winston (un Nègre) condamne ceux à Pékin qui "cherchent à parler au nom des peuples de couleur qui "comprennent qu'une pareille attitude des leaders chinois, qui sent le racisme de loin, est de la pure démagogie dont le but est de tromper les habitants des pays de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et de l'Amérique Latine". Winston affirme que les Chinois "ne parviendront pas à tromper les peuples des continents de couleur" qui "sont devenus convaincus que c'est précisément l'Union Soviétique qui est le meilleur ami des peuples amis".

6 novembre: Un article de Nodong Sinmun de la Corée du Nord a également, à l'occasion du 46e anniversaire de la révolution d'octobre, intitulé "Idée révolutionnaire d'octobre -- Bannière de la lute pour l'indépendance et la libération nationales", souligne le rôle de la révolution. "Certaines personnes propagent une théorie absurde selon laquelle aujourd'hui ... l'attache principale dans la lutte de libération nationale des colonies est passée d'un problème politique à un problème économique... Ceci ne sert qu'aux fins de la politique néo-colonialiste des impérialistes".

7 novembre: Le 46e anniversaire de la révolution soviétique d'octobre est célébré dans le monde communiste en tant que "la plus grande révolution dans l'histoire de l'homme" (selon Pékin), avec ses réunions habituelles, ses discours, ses messages, ses éditoriaux, L'accent était placé sur les résultats positifs obtenus dans le monde communiste et émanant de cette révolution et (à l'exception des Albanais et, à un moindre degré, des Nord-Coréens -- voir ci-dessous) la grande dispute restait en général ignorée ou déguisée. Même le Quotidien du peuple, qui évidemment présenta la révolution nationale en tant que "une continuation de la révolution d'octobre", souligna que le peuple chinois "restera toujours le frère le plus fidèle du peuple soviétique. Quels que soient les orages qui puissent éclater dans le monde et quels que soient les incidents que les impérialistes réactionnaires puissent provoquer, il n'hésitera jamais à s'unir et à combattre épaule contre épaule avec le grand peuple soviétique".

Cependant, il n'en est pas de même pour les Albanais. Zeri i Popullit, dans son éditorial, ne salue la tâche accomplie par le PC de l'Union Soviétique que lorsqu'elle "se trouvait sous la direction de J. V. Staline", tout en répétant les accusations habituelles des Albanais du "groupe de Khrouchtchev" qui cherche "à noircir le nom de J. V. Staline et le grand travail qu'il a accompli, dans le but de faire reviser le marxisme-léninisme"; qui "s'enfonce plus profondément encore dans le marasme et dans l'opportunisme"; qui a trahi le peuple soviétique, etc...; qui "piétine brutalement les principes révolutionnaires des documents de Moscou", etc. En Corée du Nord, l'éditorial du Nodong Sinmun soulignait sur un ton de polémique que "le triomphe de la révolution d'octobre confirme la victoire complète de la théorie de Lénine sur la révolution prolétarienne et sur la dictature proléta-

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

rienne et annonce la banqueroute définitive de l'opportunisme de la deuxième internationale qui rejeta la révolution et prêcha le réformisme".

En Yougoslavie, l'hebdomadaire "Komunist" publie un article intitulé "Réalité yougoslave et politique chinoise" en réponse à l'article du 26 septembre des journaux chinois le Quotidien du peuple et le Drapeau rouge: "La Yougoslavie est-elle un pays socialiste?" Les attaques chinoises dirigées contre la Yougoslavie socialiste, déclare l'article, "font voir que les méthodes de polémique chinoise sont intenables, irresponsables et nuisibles, et que même les voyous qui se battent dans les rues ne s'abaisseraient pas à les employer". L'article souligne de nouveau le fait que les Chinois avaient dans le passé reconnu la Yougoslavie comme pays socialiste et que depuis 1956 ils ont adopté l'attitude opposée malgré les progrès faits par la Yougoslavie pour renforcer les relations socialistes.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

No 16 26 Octubre - 8 Noviembre 1963

22 Octubre: El PC japones, en una resolucion del Pleno sobre "La situación actual y las taras del partido alrededor de las elecciones" (recibido demasiado tarde para la edición anterior) reconoce las repercusiones que han tenido en el Japón "las amargas disputas sobre la divergencia de opiniones sobre principios básicos en el movimiento comunista internacional" y establece una línea "independiente" que armoniza enteramente con la de los chinos. Demandando la "lucha contra el revisionismo contemporáneo, que es el peligro primordial según fue apuntado por la declaración de Moscú", y también la "lucha contra el dogmatismo contemporáneo, que tiene la característica de arbitrariamente sentar la línea general de política para otros partidos fraternos, y también de seguir ciegamente las políticas de otros partidos fraternos", El PCJ indirectamente reciproca contra el PCUS y el bloque alineado con los soviéticos poniéndoles la etiqueta del "dogmatismo contemporáneo" así como del "revisionismo contemporáneo". (Akahata) (V.g. el trozo sobre "seguir ciegamente a otros partidos", en el editorial de 28 de octubre de "Nodong Sinmun", comentado más abajo, sección 3).

27 Octubre: La prensa de Pekín destaca la referida resolución del PCJ; extensos trozos de un ataque contra los revisionistas reaccionarios titistas en el órgano "Nhan Dan" de Hanoi (10 de octubre?); y una declaración emitida el 23 de octubre por M. H. Williams, presidente del comité nacional del PC neozelandés, en el que subraya la "meditada opinión" del PCNZ "de que cualquir asamblea de los partidos del mundo sin preparativos adecuados de conformidad con la declaración de los 81 partidos ... sería prematura y casi seguramente se malograría".

28 Octubre: El "Diario del Pueblo" utiliza extensos trozos del ataque en 20.000 palabras del "Zeri I Popullit" albanes contra Kruschev, descrito en la Cronología de 4 de octubre. ("Pravda" el 1° de noviembre imforma indignado la publicación en Pekin del referido ataque).

El principal propagandista germanoriental Gerhard Eisler, presidente del Comité Estatal de Radio, contesta la carta de un radioyente que se refiere al llamado emitido por el cabecilla Thorez del PC francés porque se celebre una conferencia comunista internacional (Cronología, 6 Octubre): sugiriendo una posposición, declara que la convocación a una conferencia "naturalmente depende de si tal conferencia ofrece perspectivas de reducir o aun eliminar las diferencias de opinión", y por tanto "los partidos deberan esclarecer sus puntos de vista en consultas mutuas".

28 Octubre: El órgano "Nodong Sinmun" de partido norcoreano destaca un editorial de 16.000 palabras titulado "Defendamos el campo socialista", en el que presenta inclusivamente las opiniones norcoreanas sobre el conflicto -- esencialmente las opiniones de los chinos, adaptadas hasta cierto punto para cenirlas a una nación más pequeña. Exhorta a los comunista a no formar parte de nunguna maniobra para aislar a los chinos, defiende el lado chino en las cuestiones principales, y termina llamando a todos a "revolucionarse y unirse" -- y [illegible] revisionistas.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

30 Octubre: El organo "Harian Rakjat" del PC indonesio, en un editorial en apoyo del discurso de Sukarno sobre el "día del juramento juvenil", concluye en armonía con el PC chino: "Ya no es preciso explicar por qué una línea revolucionaria puede fortalecer la causa de Asia, Africa y Latinoamérica y dar ímpetu a las fuerzas emergentes, ya que a través de tal línea revolucionaria todas las fuerzas antimperialistas se pueden organizar y propinar fuertes golpes al imperialismo".

30 Octubre: El diario germanoccidental "Frankfurter Allgemeine" publica un despacho en el cual su corresponsal en Moscú informa "rumores sin confirmación" de que el Kremlin ha recibido invitación de los chinos en el sentido de reanudar sus conversaciones bilaterales en Pekín. (Hasta la fecha no hemos visto ningún otro informe de tal cosa).

31 Octubre: El Congreso del Consejo Central de Sindicatos de toda la Unión Soviética reunido en asamblea en Moscú adopta una resolutión que subraya que "los sindicatos soviéticos airadamente rechazan los burdos e infundados ataques de los dirigentes del PC chino contra el PCUS, el Gobierno soviético y nuestro pueblo".

El "Diario del Pueblo", bajo el titular de "Los exabruptos antichinos de la prensa soviética se tornan más asquerosos y fantásticos", dedica una plana íntegra a trozos tomados de artículos de prensa soviéticos atacando a China, anunciando que otros aparecerán al día siguiente. La "nota del editor" comenta que extractos de ataques anteriores habían sido publicados hace dos meses. "Desde entonces, en lugar de ejercer algún comedimiento, la prensa soviética ha estado atacando a China de una manera más agresiva y asquerosa".

De acuerdo con datos estadísticos incompletos, los ataques contra el PC chino entre 1° de septiembre y 27 de octubre en diarios y otra prensa nacional por sí solos ascienden a 430. Los 286 publicados entre 15 de julio y 31 de agosto llevan el total a 716, sin incluir los reproducidos en la prensa soviética de los partidos fraternos contra el PC chino.

El editor informa a sus lectores que "sus abusos y mentiras se acumulan más y más ... El lenguaje que emplean se vuelven aun más sucio y procaz". "Calumnian al camarada Mao Tse-tung" con más perversidad que antes, dan zarpazos a sus teorías marxistas-leninistas, a la línea china para la construcción del socialismo y las pautas chinas de conducta exterior e interior. Alegando que los estadistas chinos tienen una consigna de "Bajo los blancos", utilizan hasta epítetos como 'los renegados de Pekín' y 'duelistas salvajes', y hablan de 'la conciencia de los dirigentes de Pekín como semejante a las aguas negras', etc."

1° Noviembre: De nuevo publica el "Diario del Pueblo" selecciones de ataques soviéticos e imprime el texto completo del discurso de 29 de septiembre pronunciado en Jakarta por Aidit, presidente del PKI (Cronología, 29 septiembre).

2 Noviembre: La prensa de Pekín publica un editorial de 10.000 palabras del "Diario del Pueblo", titulado "La verdad de cómo los dirigentes del PCUS se han aliado con India contra China", en contestación

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

al editorial de "Pravda" de 19 de septiembre titulado "Grave semillero de tensión en Asia" (publicado por el "Diario del Pueblo" el 25 de septiembre) y la declaración del gobierno soviético de 21 de septiembre sobre el mismo tema. Dentro del marco de la versión nítidamente tendenciosa de los "hechos" de la querella fronteriza entre India y China (hechos "respetados" por "los países afroasiaticos que mantienen estricta neutralidad") los dirigentes chinos acusan a los dirigentes soviéticos (que "hacen caso omiso de los hechos" y que "tanto se han degenerado que se burlan de la lógica elemental") de "no economizar esfuerzos por sembrar la discordia" y "esforzarse aun más que los imperialistas norteamericanos en apoyo de los reaccionarios indios".

> ¿Cuál es su "verdadero propósito al concitar la tensión?"
> "Para hablar con franqueza: los dirigentes soviéticos lo están haciendo porque quieren explotar la cuestión fronteriza para sembrar la disensión entre China y otros países afroasiáticos, desviar al pueblo de Asia y Africa de la lucha contra el imperialismo y encubrir las actividades agresivas y belicistas de los imperialistas norteamericanos. Esto constituye traición a la causa revolucionaria y antimperialista del pueblo de Asia y, de hecho, de todo el mundo."

El artículo incluye un resumen de 16 puntos de los intercambios chino-soviéticos con motivo del conflicto fronterizo chino-indio; denuncia las declaraciones soviéticas como ridículas o "sencillamente mentiras"; se mofa de los soviéticos con frases tales como "mercaderes de municiones" y "empresarios de una sociedad anónima con los imperialistas norteamericanos"; acusa a los dirigentes soviéticos de traicionar al pueblo indio, advirtiendo que "dicha cuanta va a arreglarse tarde o temprano"; y finalmente los acusa de emplear "organizaciones internacionales de masa" tales como el Congreso Mundial de Mujeres en Moscú y la conferencia de la OSPAA en Moshi para tratar de desbaratar el frente unido antimperialista".

> Concluye el editorial:
> "Se hace cada vez más claro que los dirigentes soviéticos ya no consideran como su enemigo a los imperialistas encabezados por los Estados Unidos y a los reaccionarios de todos los países. Son los marxistas-leninistas, los revolucionarios, y China en particular, los que son su enemigo...
>
> "Quisiéramos aconsejar a los dirigentes soviéticos no regocijarse demasiado pronto. La China revolucionaria jamás puede ser aislada. Mientras más descaradamente colaboren ustedes con todos los imperialistas y reaccionarios, tanto más se aíslan a sí mismos. China no puede ser desacreditada, pues la verdad está de parte de China. El tendón de Aquiles de ustedes es su falta de respeto por la verdad. Más del 90 por ciento de los pueblos de la tierra se atienen a la verdad... Los que no tiene respeto a la verdad fracasarán por fin".

Todos los periódicos chinos publican también un informe de la Agencia Nueva China sobre el incremento en la ayuda económica y militar soviética a India en oposición a China. El "Diario del Pueblo" lo titula: "Cuanto mayor la ayuda soviética a India, tanto más fre-

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

nética su cámpaña anti-China".

El informe de la agencia yugoslava Tanyug desde Pekín sobre "la aparición de este último documento antisoviético, de estremada amargura", dicen que los "observadores en Pekín" le han prestado especial atención como "uno de los ataques más severos contra los dirigentes soviéticos". Continúa Tanyug:

> "Se dice que tiene dos fines: en el escenario doméstico avanzar la actividad antisoviética en una formá que toca al sentimiento nacional; en el escenario exterior, un nuevo esfuerzo por desacreditar a la Unión Soviética entre los países recién libertados, subdesarrollados y todavía por libertar".

Tass informa desde Bogotá que le XXIX Plenaria del PC colombiano "unánimememte adoptó una resolución condenando las actividades escisionistas de los dirigentes del PC chino", que "nada tienen en común con el marxismo-leninismo".

La Agencia Nueva China informa desde Rangún que "dirigentes públicos birmanos en sus declaraciones hoy severamente condenaron el rechazo por parte del Gobierno indio de una solución pacífica para la cuestión fronteriza chino-india". Cita las de "el secretario general del Frente Unido Nacional de Birmania, Bo Mya Thwar"; el "miembro del politburó del Partido Unido de los Trabajadores de Birmania"; y el "miembro del comité ejecutivo del Comité pro Paz Mundial de toda Birmania, U Aing Ze".

3 Noviembre: "Pravda" publica un artículo del secretario general del PC portugués Alvaro Cunhal con motivo del aniversario de la Revolución soviética describiendo "la sorpresa e indignación" entre los comunistas de todos los países ante la "campaña antisoviética... apoyada por los dirigentes del PC chino". Sin embargo, él cree con optimismo que la amistad entre los fraternos será inquebrantable.

La prensa china publica un informe de la Agencia Nueva China desde Bruselas en el sentido de que "los comunistas belgas que apoyan el marxismo-leninismo han publicado un semimensuario, "La Voz del Pueblo"" y en octubre publicado dos ediciones.

4 Noviembre: El órgano "Scinteia" del PC rumano publica un artículo del presidente del Consejo de ministros rumano y miembro del politburó, Maurer (el artículo apareció más o menos simultáneamente en el número de octubre del órgano teórico "Lupta de Clasa" y el número de noviembre de "Problemas de la Paz y el Socialismo", la "Revista Mundial Marxista") dedicado al tercer aniversario de la conferencia de 81 partidos celebrada en Moscú, condenando los ataques polémicos, insultos y tergiversación de opiniones y la imposición de las decisiones de un partido sobre los demás. Maurer declara a continuación que el partido rumano ve con agrado la propuesta anterior del PCUS por el cese de las polémicas y "apoya el trabajo paciente y persistente por crear las condiciones para la celebración de una nueva conferencia de partidos comunistas y obreros para que puedan ser debatidas las actuales divergencias de opinión entre las dirigencias de los partidos".

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

5 Noviembre: Un artículo en "Pravda" sobre el 46° aniversario escrito por el comunista norteamericano Henry Winston (un negro) condena a los que en Pekín "están tratando de hablar a nombre de los 'pueblos de color'" del mundo, que "entienden que tal punto de vista de los dirigentes chinos, que huele a racismo a gran distancia, es la más pura demagogia con intención de engañar a los habitantes de Asia, Africa y América Latina". Declara Winston que los chinos "no conseguirán engañar a los pueblos de los continentes de color", que "se han convencido que la Unión Soviética es precisamente la mejor amiga de los pueblos oprimidos".

6 Noviembre: Un artículo de "Nodong Sinmun" de Corea del Norte con motivo del 46° aniversario de la Revolución de Octubre titulado "Ideas revolucionarias de octubre -- bandera de lucha por la liberación e independencia nacional", destaca el papel de la revolución. "Algunas gentes están difundiendo una absurda teoría de que hoy... la principal tarea de la lucha por la liberación nacional en las colonias ha pasado de un problema político a ser uno económico ... Esto servirá solamente a la política neocolonialista de los imperialistas".

7 Noviembre: Se celebra el 46° aniversario de la Revolución soviética de "Octubre" como "la más grande revolución en la historia de la humanidad" (palabras de Pekín) con las asambleas, discursos, mensajes y editoriales de costumbre. El énfasis recayó sobre las realizaciones positivas en el mundo que emanan de dicha Revolución y (excepción hecha de los albaneses y, a un grado mucho menor, los norcoreanos -- véase más adelante) la gran querella fue generalmente pasada por alto completa o parcialmente. Hasta el "Diario del Pueblo", que por supuesto presentó la revolución china como "continuación de la Revolución de Octubre", recalcó que el pueblo chino permanecerá como el amigo más digno de confianza del pueblo soviético. No importa qué tormenta se desencadene ni qué incidente puedan provocar los imperialistas y reaccionarios, nunca titubeará en unirse al gran pueblo soviético y luchar hombro a hombro con él".

No así los albaneses. El editorial de "Zeri I Popullit" rindió tributo a las realizaciones del PCUS cuando estaba "dirigido por J. V. Stalin". repitiendo entretanto la acostumbrada condena albanesa del "grupo de Kruschev" que está tratando de "oscurecer el nombre y la gran obra de J. V. Stalin para revisar el marxismo-leninismo"; que "se está hundiendo más y más en el pantano del oportunismo"; que está brutalmente pisoteando los principios revolucionarios de los documentos de Moscú", etc. En Corea del Norte, el editorial de "Nodong Sinmun" se aproximó a los polémico en su énfasis de que "el triunfo de la Revolución del Octubre confirmó la completa victoria de la teoría de Lenin de la revolución proletaria y la dictadura del proletariado y anunció la bancarrota definitiva del oportunismo de la Segunda Internacional que rechazó la revolución y predicó el reformismo".

En Yugoslavia, el semanario "Komunist" publica un artículo titulado "La Realidad yugoslava y la política china", replicando al artículo de 26 septiembre en el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" titulado "Es Yugoslavia país socialista?" Los ataques chinos contra Yugoslavia socialista, expresa, "desencubren lo insostenible, irresponsable y dañino de los métodos de las 'polémicas' chinas, que ni

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siquiera los pendencieros de calleja no se dignarían emplear".
El artículo otra vez presta gran atención al hecho de que una vez los chinos reconocieron a Yugoslavia como socialista y desde 1956 se han renegado a pesar del mayor progreso de Yugoslavia en el refuerzo de las relaciones socialistas.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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711. International Fronts Afflicted by Sino-Soviet Dissensions

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[redacted]

BACKGROUND: Since December, 1962, the Sino-Soviet ideological battle has erupted openly whenever the representatives of Communist front organizations have gathered. From about that time until shortly before the announcement of the US-UK-USSR agreement on a partial nuclear test ban, the Chicoms had for several months successfully disrupted international assemblages of established front organizations. With some initial success, they had also launched a drive to counter Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world through the exploitation of established groups and attempts at establishing new Chicom-dominated front organizations. The Soviets were clearly unprepared at first to cope with the Chicom methods of competing for leadership of the fronts.

Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the Chicom offensive in the fronts shifted into high gear after the massive acrimonious attacks from the Chicoms at and after the Fifth World Congress of Women (WIDF, Moscow; 24-29 June). Apparently anticipating that Chicom reaction to the test ban treaty would intensify quarreling within the fronts, the CPSU's "Open Letter" (14 July) to the Chicoms denounced the latter's disruptive tactics in the "international democratic organizations" from the time of the WFTU General Council meeting in Peking in June, 1960 up to the June WIDF Congress. International front gatherings since the publication of the "Open Letter" suggest that within the existing fronts the Soviets have regained the initiative and are outmaneuvering the Chicoms with a considerable measure of tactical success. For the moment the Chicoms' position is further isolated because the momentum in their campaign for the take-over of existing Afro-Asian fronts or the creation of additional competitive ones has apparently slackened. In carrying the dissension into the fronts the Chicoms have exposed, of necessity or by design, more clearly than Tito did in 1949, these front organizations as Soviet-controlled propaganda organizations in which polycentric ideological diversity cannot be tolerated.

Because the fronts, including and particularly AAPSO and its offshoots, have become fully drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict, they have been seriously hampered for months in carrying off the mission for which they were conceived: to "front" for the World Communist Movement (WCM), as represented by Communist Parties, in winning over to a variety of propaganda causes the masses of workers, women, youth and students,

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scientists, "peace seekers," etc. Indeed, there is now sufficient evidence that at least since the beginning of the year the exploiting of neutrals, various shades of leftists, pacifists, fence-sitters, intellectuals and all the rest who are susceptible to Communist blandishments, particularly in the underdeveloped world areas, has per force been relegated to secondary priority. This is not to mean that the fronts have abandoned their basic missions -- not at all. The Sino-Soviet conflict has taken its toll within the fronts and the battle for their proper Communist orientation has assumed top priority, absorbing a major portion of the planning, scheming and activities within both contesting camps. This phenomenon offers great opportunities for (overt and) covert exploitation.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has a particularly profound effect on AAPSO and its affiliates. AAPSO's future depends in large measure on whether the Chicoms are prepared to continue their attempts to gain influence through this organization or whether they will prefer to concentrate their efforts on Afro-Asian conferences and organizations which they sponsor themselves to the exclusion of the Soviets. In all probability the Chicoms will continue to seek the second course, but for reasons of prestige as well as re-insurance it is most improbable that they will abandon AAPSO altogether. In any event, AAPSO's image has not been enhanced by the exposure of its Communist exploitation and its display of lack of solidarity. /See unclassified attachment for details of front conflict/.

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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

~~SECRET~~ 18 November 1963

712 AF,NE,WH. Castro's Military Aid to Algeria Backfires

25X1C10b [redacted]

BACKGROUND: From the moment Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba, nearly five years ago, he has sought to play the role of spiritual leader of all leftist revolutionary forces in Latin America. At the same time, Cuba has not only become the base for the training of revolutionary cadres brought in from other Latin American countries but has also served as the point of origin for the clandestine exportation of small arms, ammunition, and explosives to be used in guerrilla operations elsewhere on the continent.

Normally, the country on the receiving end of this type of export considers such activity an unwarranted interference in its internal affairs and can be expected to take drastic diplomatic action. For this and other reasons, all but 5 of the 21 American republics have in fact severed diplomatic relations with Cuba since the end of 1959.

Now, however, Castro has expanded his subversive exports beyond the Western Hemisphere, by shipping tanks and other material to Algeria and was caught in flagrant intervention in the border dispute between that country and Morocco. Morocco swiftly retaliated by severing diplomatic relations.

Cuban Military Aid to Algeria.

As early as 13 October, the Cuban ship Aracelio Iglesias was observed in the port of Havana loading a large quantity of arms and ammunition covered with sacks of sugar. At the time it was suspected that the cargo was destined for Algeria. On 14 October, Cuban refugees arriving in Madrid on a special Cubana flight which traveled via Algiers stated that their plane carried cases of munitions which were off-loaded in Algeria. During the week of 21 October, two Cubana planes carried 170 Cuban military personnel to Algiers. Some of these were jet pilots, others were ordnance specialists.

By the end of October, three Cuban ships had unloaded supplies in Algeria, which included at least 20 Soviet tanks and unspecified quantities of rifles, machine guns, field guns, bazookas, mortars and ammunition. In addition to the 179 technicians mentioned above who arrived by plane, one of the ships, according to an Associated Press despatch dated 31 October, brought 300 Cuban technicians, who were issued Algerian battle dress as soon as they left the ship.

Morocco, One of Cuba's Biggest Sugar Importers, Severs Relations. It was no surprise, therefore, that Moroccan Foreign Minister, Ahmed Balafrej, announced on 31 October that his

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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

country had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba because "Premier Fidel Castro had shipped Soviet arms to Algeria during the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict."

Whether he acted on Moscow's orders or on his own impulse, Fidel Castro has alienated, politically and psychologically, one of the best customer's of Cuba's perennially mismanaged economy. In spite of this, Morocco has not and probably will not cancel its trade agreement with Cuba. In 1960, with 161,000 metric tons, Morocco ranked third among free world importers of Cuban sugar. In 1961 and 1962, it moved up to second place. As of 30 June 1963, Morocco had already imported 128,000 tons, and there are now indications that it may, during the current year, import more sugar from Cuba than any other country in the non-Communist world.

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

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~~SECRET~~ 18 November 1963

25X1C10b 713 AF,FE,WH. Communist China's Trade with Non-Bloc Countries

[redacted]

BACKGROUND: The Chinese Communist attitude toward trade, particularly with non-Communist countries, is first that it can only be tolerated until internal self-sufficiency can be achieved, and second, that maximum political and propaganda capital must be extracted from the conduct of foreign economic relations. The latter purpose is demonstrated by the CPR's conduct of trade relations with countries of the Near East, Africa and South America, where the value of the potential commercial exchanges does not warrant the degree of formalization (e.g. delegations back and forth, negotiation of terms, etc.) involved. The prime motive appears to be the expansion of Chinese influence on a world-wide basis with a concentration on those countries which have or may be encouraged toward a pro-Communist or anti-Western bias. Examples are the trade agreements made with Egypt following the attack on the Suez Canal and with Cuba when its conflict with the United States led to the cessation of the sugar-purchase agreement.

In Southeast Asia, Communist China has on several occasions offered to supply newsprint to local newspapers at considerable reductions in price. After the terms and contracts are arranged and the local newspaper finds itself dependent on the Chinese Communists for supplies of newsprint, they also find themselves at the mercy of Red China on the question of what they do or do not print in their newspapers.

In Africa, China has made trade agreements or arrangements with Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia. (Offers of substantial trade and aid to the newly born African nations have impressed the representatives of some of them who have found it difficult to differentiate between Communist China's political as against its professed humanitarian motives.) In the Middle East, China has trade agreements with Syria, Iraq, the Yemen, and in South America with Brazil and Chile. Most of these arrangements provide for the establishment in the countries concerned of Chinese personnel as diplomatic officials, trade representatives or technical experts. When non-Communist nations establish trade relations, permit the opening of trade agencies and sanction visits from Red China's trade delegations, these openings are used to engage in political subversion and to strengthen ties with local Communist parties and front organizations. In the past, Communist China has channeled its trade with non-Bloc countries as far as possible through firms, individuals or agents which were Communist-controlled or pro-Communist; the profits from such trade agencies were frequently used to finance Peking's political and subversive activities in the country of the trading agency.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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Trade Shift to non-Communist Countries? The Sino-Soviet dispute has brought about fairly substantial reductions in trade between the CPR and the rest of the Communist orbit. China has subsequently initiated efforts to improve its trading position with non-Communist countries. In 1962 and 1963 Communist Chinese delegations visited various Japanese and Western equipment firms; although few contracts have been signed, the delegations collected technical data and market information and expanded contacts with Western manufacturers. These delegations have supplemented China's regular sources of technical and market information but it is questionable whether there was any urgent need for data. Even in 1957, the CPR began to make inquiries and solicit offers from non-Bloc suppliers of machinery and equipment, including exporters of equipment for complete plants. Communist China has had the mechanisms to know about market conditions and technical developments in the free world to such an extent that its buyers have gained a reputation for shrewdness, knowledgeability and for driving a hard bargain.

Against this background, the many shopping delegations that China has sent to Western Europe and Japan since 1960, in addition to acquiring useful trade information, appears to be part of a deliberate Chinese campaign to nurture a climate of expectation of markets among free world businessmen. A clamor for Chinese orders will strengthen Peking's bargaining position when the time comes to negotiate contracts and permit China to play off one supplier against another. It is also likely that the Chinese Communists want to encourage Western businessmen to bring pressure to bear on their own governments to loosen the restrictions on trade in strategic commodities. Actually, any sudden growth in orders placed with Western suppliers would require intense efforts on the part of the Chinese to expand the production of products for export to the free world. China would probably find it extremely difficult to market enough exports to balance any large increase in imports. The acquisition of medium-term credits from Western suppliers would have to be relied upon but only moderate amounts of such credits seem likely to be available in the next two or three years.

Large-scale diversion of Chinese trade from Bloc to non-Bloc countries would also involve initial costs to the Chinese in developing new markets for their exports and new sources for their imports, and in making costly and time-consuming adjustments to Western specifications for most machinery imports. Such a diversion of trade would also presumably place restraints on Chinese Communist foreign policy, including subordination of certain political goals and willingness to supply technical data to foreign businessmen, to accept non-Bloc technicians in China and to send her own technicians outside China for training. The Chinese Communist attitude has been that only if the need is urgent enough, is it proper as a temporary expedient to cooperate with the capitalist enemy. (For example, when the Chinese decided to buy complicated non-Bloc machinery,

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this decision included the acceptance of technicians -- the use of technicians was included in the deals for French electric locomotives, British airplanes, and French textile equipment.)

Status and Prospects of the CPR's foreign trade. The low level of China's agricultural and industrial production and the decision to prepay certain obligations to the USSR were the major factors that caused a decline for the third consecutive year in the total value of Chinese Communist foreign trade. Almost all of the 1962 decline was accounted for by decreased trade with other Communist countries. As the Sino-Soviet rift developed, China has initiated policies preparing reorientation of its foreign economic relations. As a result, trade with non-Communist countries now accounts for about 50 percent of total foreign trade, whereas in 1959 it accounted for only about one third of the total. Assuming a continuation of present Party and State relations between the USSR and Communist China, dramatic changes in the level, direction and composition of China's foreign trade are not expected in the next two years, although the long-term prospect is for a gradual shift of Communist China's trade away from the USSR and toward non-Bloc countries.

Chinese Communist Trading Practices. Under these circumstances it is imperative that nations, firms and individuals acquaint themselves in some detail with Chinese Communist trading practices to protect their own economic interests but also to minimize the extent to which Communist China can exploit commercial and economic contacts to its own political advantage.

In the first place, it should be understood that the Sino-Soviet rift is the major factor in Communist China's efforts to seek economic relations with non-Bloc countries, and economic relations between Communist China and the USSR was one of the earliest areas of discord in the dispute. It is apparent that if two Communist countries cannot trade on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis, it is highly unlikely that a non-Communist country will achieve a satisfactory trading relationship with them.

Perhaps the outstanding example of the use of trade as a political weapon is in relations between China and Japan. Trade between the two countries declined sharply during the Korean War but thereafter began to increase and by 1957 produced a useful surplus in China's favor. The trade was fostered by a series of unofficial trade agreements between Chinese state-trading corporations and groups of Japanese companies. Prior to the Japanese elections in the spring of 1958, the Chinese Communists conducted an intensified drive for trade with Japan and a contract was drawn up in Peking for some $280 million worth of industrial goods. However, implementation of the agreement was made subject to official approval and ratification of the Japanese government, a proviso that would involve de facto recognition of the Peking regime. When official Japanese ratification was not forthcoming, the

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Chinese Communists broke all direct trade relations with Japan and immediately cancelled all outstanding contracts without notice. Many Japanese firms were left with serious financial losses by this CPR maneuver.

A large Canadian import firm recently announced that its interest in trade with Communist countries had virtually disappeared because conditions of trade were so unsatisfactory. The firm reported that it had received food shipped in rusty cans, perfumes with unacceptable fragrances, typewriters with foreign keys, crooked skis, light fixtures with misfitting sockets, substandard textile goods and machines with damaged couplings. It was also reported that Communist pricing practices were unacceptable. Products were generally priced lower than those quoted on comparable goods by Western producers in order to penetrate the market. However, on repeat orders prices are raised, often without any advance notice to the importer. Such actions are costly to Western businessmen who determine their prices on the basis of quotations and who are obligated to supply goods to their own customers on the basis of the quotations. The importer in effect finds that he is paying his customer to buy his goods!

Many international trading firms find that the Chinese Communist state trading corporations insist on using their form of contract for both buying and selling. There is a striking difference between the wording of their contract forms for purchase and for sale: the former binds the foreign seller very tightly; the latter is, in effect, little more than a general statement of intent. Further, changes are made unilaterally giving maximum protection to the Chinese Communists.

In 1959, traders who held contracts with the Chinese Communists for the delivery of agricultural produce suffered another kind of default. After severe crop failures, Communist China not only failed to make shipments of agricultural produce on the due date but also ignored requests for information regarding shipping dates. Although they finally admitted that they could not meet the contracts to supply goods, they refused to say so in writing or to claim force majeure, which would in turn have allowed many buyers to cancel contracts with their customers with little or no loss. Communist China's trading partners in this case suffered financial losses simply because the CPR could not admit that a Communist country had not met its production quotas.

Communist China's poor record as a trading partner stems not only from the fact that her trade is conducted, naturally, from a Communist point of view, but also from the fact that one of China's valued traditional assets was her large class of reputable and knowledgable businessmen and merchants. Communist China's own purges destroyed that class and with it they destroyed much of China's historical capacity and facility for international trade.

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

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[redacted] 18 November 1963

714 NE,WH. Iran's "White Revolution"

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BACKGROUND: Iran's so-called "white revolution," directed by the ruler of a 2500-year old monarchy who is dedicated to agricultural and industrial reform, is a modern leap forward for this feudal society. Contrary to revolutionary patterns among most underprivileged nations today, this is a revolution-by-law, conceived by the Shah and implemented by cabinet-level government officials.

Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's goal is to pull his fourteenth century kingdom into a twentieth century world. The drastic task requires drastic means. /See unclassified attachment "Reform Program in Iran" for a description of reform plans and problems. Also Press Comment 31 October for New York Times article, magazine section, 27 October./ Rich in unexplored resources but suffering from an archaic agricultural and social structure, Iran could not afford to await gradual enlightenment and economic stimulus from increasing contacts with the outside world. The Shah undoubtedly has also recognized that the reign of the modern monarch is secure only if it rests on a solid
25X1C10b economic base and enjoys broad popular support.

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

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THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT WITHIN INTERNATIONAL FRONTS

The Polemic Exchange

711

> Peking's hostile attitude to a nuclear test ban is the culmination of the generally negative approach of the Chinese leadership to problems of the peoples' struggle for disarmament and peace.
>
> ("Against Falsification")

An editorial article published in Pravda (August 15), reportedly based on an issuance ("Against Falsification") of the World Peace Council's Secretariat, traces the intransigence of the Chicom stand on nuclear testing and on easing international tensions from 1958. The WPC claims that, "... at the 1962 Congress for General Disarmament and Peace the Chinese delegation voted ... for the prohibition of nuclear tests ... and on its return to Peking ... began to decry the results of the Congress."

However, apparently not until the WFTU Conference on the Common Market (Leipzig, Dec. 14-17, 1962) did the Chicoms refuse to end an international front meeting without a compromise. Disagreement over the Soviet handling of its part in the Cuban crisis and over Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border dispute undoubtedly helped provoke the Chicoms to maintain throughout that conference an all-out attack on the "imperialist" Common Market. Their "hard line" conflicted with the Soviet position.

The Chicoms replied to the Pravda article of August 15 saying that "... modern revisionists .. dare not offend US imperialism." "It is indeed painful for us to find that the Secretariat of the WPC under the baton of the modern revisionists should have sunk so low as to become an organ propagating the line of capitulation." - (Speech at Peking, 24 August 1963) Since December, 1962 the Chicoms have constantly repeated that eventual completion of the "socialist revolution" is threatened while imperialist nations maintain nuclear armaments and while the proponents of the socialist struggle do not have a nuclear capability. Hence, nuclear disarmament must be complete; half-way measures preserve the great power monopoly of nuclear weapons. The Chicoms condemn the Soviet Union's great power chauvinism for its espousal of "peaceful coexistence" and its agreement to cease nuclear testing in only three spheres (air, water, space). Over and over again in 1963 the intensity of their opposition to these policies has been illustrated, inter alia, through the medium of the international fronts;

> Peaceful coexistence refers to relationship between States with different social systems, and must not be extended to cover the relationship between oppressed and

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> oppressor nations...or between oppressed and oppressor classes. At no time is it possible for the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with the imperialists... To ask the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with imperialism is to force them to give up their struggle and to keep them for ever in the position of being oppressed and enslaved. To tell the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with the imperialists in order that one can enter into a compromise of 'co-operation' with the imperialists is tantamount to sacrificing the fundamental interests of these countries and peoples and serving the interests of imperialism...
> (WIDF, Fifth World Congress of Women, June, 1963)

> This /partial nuclear test ban/ treaty allows the aggressor the right of massacre and denies the victims the right of self defense.
> (Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1963)

The Chinese Trade Union Federation called the WFTU Secretary General Saillant's favorable reception of the partial test ban treaty representative of his personal views rather than of WFTU. The day after the Chicoms had denounced Saillant's approval of the treaty, Pravda defended the views he had expressed.

> ... Chinese leaders are ready to sacrifice the health of millions of people and that of generations to come. ...Their sole concern is to justify the policy of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic which is doing everything it can to join in the nuclear arms race.
> ("Against Falsification")

The Pravda article quotes the WPC as saying that the Chicom delegate's speech at Malmo in March, 1963 (convocation of WPC Presidential Committee) is sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Cheng Shen-yu spoke of "the right of all States to possess nuclear weapons and demanded 'action against a monoply of nuclear weapons.'" The Chicom response at Hiroshima was not a denial. Rather they attacked a Soviet Vice President of the WPC, a Pravda writer active in the peace movement, and a former Soviet Secretary in the WPC Secretariat, to whom they attributed the opinion "that under the threat of destructive thermo-nuclear war, national liberation movements should not be attempted," and further stated that

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> "... the Secretariat of the WPC, working under the baton of the modern revisionists, has been giving less and less support to the national liberation movement, and even damaging it.

The Chicoms express the belief that liberation of all national groups suppressed by colonialism or neo-colonialism must be militantly pursued. They are dissatisfied with the leadership that the existing fronts are providing. At the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Conakry (Oct. 15-22, 1962), the Chicom delegate called to task those who use the "need for breadth in the composition of the peace movement" as a shield to hide their neglect of the national liberation movement. The Soviets suggest that the Chicoms would like to liquidate the peace movement, unified under the auspices of the WPC, and replace it with a "militant worldwide movement for peace on the basis of the unity and militant spirit of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." That the Chinese want a militant, anti-imperialist WPC is true. That they will give up the effort to win European "peace fighters" to their side is much less clear.

Chicom Tactical Moves in International Front Organizations: A Bogged-down Offensive. In their struggle to wrest from the Soviets their leadership of the international communist movement, the Chicoms are placing emphasis on persuading Asia, Africa and Latin America to align with them. The Chicoms are seeking support for their more militant policy lines from, inter alia, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) as well as through other newly-created and proposed Afro-Asian front organizations. To accomplish these aims, the Chicoms are attempting to bloc the growth of Soviet influence in the new groups and to make Soviet participation in them impossible, and also to reduce the Soviets' power in those groups in which they are already members. Plans conceived more than three years ago to bring Latin American organizations into the AAPSO complex now figure prominently in the Sino-Soviet jockeying for position. The Soviets and Chicoms have heretofore agreed that AAPSO should embrace Latin American groups. Disagreement on how a "link-up" should be implemented and on what the main themes of this joint effort should be has impeded actual accomplishment of such a merger. The Soviets have sought to dominate the "Three Continent" solidarity alliance by having Latin American organizers come in through the pro-Soviet WPC affiliates, whereas the Chicoms insist that the WPC, in spite of its cooperation with AAPSO since that group's inception, should not participate in "Three Continent" planning.

Chicom opposition to including the Soviet-dominated WPC in the "Three Continent" project dates back at least to the WPC's 1961 Disarmament Conference in Stockholm. In February, 1963 at the Third AAPSO Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika -- which proved to be a predominently pro-Chinese affair -- WPC representatives were not allowed to speak and were excluded from the "Three Continent" solidarity committee work which proposed that a "Three Continent" peace conference be held in Havana.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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It appeared at the Moshi conference that the Chicoms used appeals with racist overtones vis-a-vis the Africans, playing themselves up as "dependable" in contrast to the Soviets whose basic affinity, they claim, is with the imperialist "whites." In fact, after the conference, the CPSU Open Letter of 14 July accused the Chicoms of having stated to Soviet delegates at Moshi that "whites have no business here."

Meanwhile, in the WPC itself, the Chicoms have withdrawn their representatives from the secretariat and ceased to render it financial aid, in reaction to the WPC's outright backing of the test ban treaty. However, to assure that WPC countermeasures do not isolate the Chicoms from the Afro-Asian and Latin American WPC affiliates the Chicoms have persisted in participating in the WPC's policy making meetings and international congresses.

Working on Indonesian soil, under the guise of Indonesian sponsorship, the Chicoms repeated their Moshi performance with success at the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference (AAJC) in Djakarta (24 April - 1 May) and at the Afro-Asian Writers Conference (AAWC) in Djakarta/Danpasar, Bali (12-20 July). At the AAJC, the representatives of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and of the Soviet Union were accorded observer status only, despite their vehement protests. Thus, with Indonesia playing the willing tool, the Chicoms relegated the traditional leaders to the role of "outsiders," and limited the Soviet ability to manipulate the proceedings to fit their own objectives. Indeed, the conference called into being an Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization and an Afro-Asian Journalists' Bureau, both based in Indonesia, which were to work independently of the IOJ. In other words, the Chicoms created a parallel body and laid the groundwork for splitting of a Soviet-controlled international front. On this occasion, they also reiterated plans for a "Three Continent" link-up of journalists. The AAWC made little reference in its proceedings to its AAPSO parentage. Communist exploitation of its proceedings revealed the same pattern as was displayed at the AAJC, with the same pronounced Chicom slant and the same Indonesian support for the position of the Chicoms.

The Moshi Conference recommended the convening of an Afro-Asian trade union conference without specifying where and when it should be held. Meanwhile, Indonesian trade unions, with obvious backing of the Chicoms had proposed a similar meeting in Djakarta from which the Soviets apparently were to be excluded. But this scheme ran into problems.

The Soviets persuaded the AAPSO Executive Committee meeting in Nicosia (9-12 September) to call for the holding of an Afro-Asian trade union conference in Africa under the sponsorship of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat. The Indonesians and Chicoms were opposed to this decision, declaring that they would not feel bound by it. After long hesitation, the Indonesians, under pressure from the Soviet Government and trade

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unions, the WFTU, as well as important "unaligned" governments and trade unions, at the last minute admitted the Soviet trade unions as co-sponsors of the preliminary Afro-Asian Labor Conference (AALC). The invitation extended to the Soviets for the Djakarta conference reportedly was based on conditions that AAPSO abandon its plan adopted at Nicosia and that the WFTU cease its opposition to the Djakarta Conference. These conditions could hardly be made binding on AAPSO or WFTU; apparently, they were a face-saving gesture to the Indonesian sponsoring unions.

The preliminary AALC, meeting from 28 October to 2 November, resolved to hold the full conference in Spring of 1963 with the Soviets as co-sponsors. The meeting announced that delegations to the full conference will be representatives of labor organizations regardless of their political or religious convictions. However, participating labor organizations must be against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. All international organizations which support the aims of the conference will be allowed to attend.

In the meantime, at the 13th Soviet Trade Union Congress attended by trade union representatives from some 90 countries, which opened in Moscow also on 28 October, both WFTU Secretary General Saillant and Soviet Congress chairman Viktor Grishin implicitly condemned the Chicom attempts to form separate Afro-Asian international organizations under Chicom control. Grishin stated he favored international labor meetings as long as they were based on the principle of proletarian internationalism (i.e. based on class rather than race) but he cannot support such conferences if they are organized on national distinctions and without the participation of the trade unions of other (i.e. non-Afro-Asian) countries, the Soviet trade unions and the WFTU. Grishin added that otherwise such a conference will only harm the international trade union movement, the interests of the workers, and the Afro-Asian trade unions themselves.

Although still avidly pursuing their tactics of confrontation with the Soviets the Chicoms have made slow progress in setting up their rival organizations. In addition to the establishment of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization, they founded a so-called "Peking Center for the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)" in September, but its first conference, a Symposium to be attended by Asians, Africans and Latin Americans will not be held until August 1964.

Soviet counter-offensive in the fronts. With its control over the international fronts challenged, the Soviet Union has shed the mask which usually hides that control. The USSR has blatantly exhibited an array of Leninist tricks conceived to counter Chicom incursions in the fronts and to stave off the threat of Chicom-sponsored rival fronts.

The Soviet-directed fronts have taken steps which can only be construed as a direct bid to prevent the Afro-Asian (Latin American) Solidarity Movement from succumbing to Chicom influence.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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have been initiated to assert the WPC's right to wave "the banner for progressive nuclear disarmament" on those continents. In reaction to the Indonesian proposal to hold an Afro-Asian Labor Conference, the WFTU assembled its Afro-Asian affiliates at a conference in Prague (July 27-28, 1963); and the Soviets used diplomatic pressure vis-a-vis the Indonesian government (Also see coverage under "Chicom Tactical Moves"). Upon the announcement that Afro-Asian student and youth fronts would be formed, the WFDY sent a delegation to tour Southeast Asia. Measures to divert Afro-Asian attention from the "new fronts" have been undertaken concurrently with moves to mitigate Chicom "splitting activities" in the established international fronts.

The Soviet leaders in the fronts have resorted to postponing conferences to eliminate immediate opportunities for the Chicoms to flaunt at front conferences their refusal to accept the current Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The WPC Executive Committee Meeting, which had been scheduled for Warsaw in June, was suddenly cancelled at the last moment, in spite of the advanced stage that preparations had reached in many countries.[1] Countless other events have been rescheduled again and again (e.g.: Latin American Youth Conference, planned for August in Santiago, Chile, postponed according to latest reporting until March 1964; Women Workers (WFTU) Conference, Bucharest, planned well in advance for 14-19 October, etc.).

At those conferences that were held the Chicoms have been outmaneuvered by the unrestrained use of Soviet power. The Chicoms have accused the Soviets, not without some justification, of using vote rigging and "heavy-handed" parliamentary procedures to silence them at the WIDF Conference in June and at the AAPSO Executive Committee Meeting in Nicosia in September. When it seemed that JCP-JSP disagreement over the test ban treaty would obstruct the convening at Hiroshima (5-7 August) of the Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the WPC delegation submitted what NCNA (August 6) termed a "scheme ... to deprive overseas delegates of their status as delegates." The WPC officials proposed that the International attendees participate as observers. NCNA pointed out that the WPC statement was issued after the arrival of the Soviet delegation, whose leader, G. Zhukov, demanded that the international session of the World Conference not be held, saying that the Soviet Union would not participate in a conference in which it was being tried as an "enemy of the people." NCNA concluded that the WPC is merely a Soviet "puppet", since (prior to the Soviet

[1] Tactical Retreat -- after the Chicom exhibition at the WPC's Executive Committee Meeting in March, the next meeting had been designated for Warsaw, the first time since 1954 that a Council meeting had not been convened outside the Bloc.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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arrival) did Soviet delegates with other foreign delegates that the "United World Conference" get underway as soon as possible. Although Soviet efforts to prevent the convening of the international conference failed, the USSR's representatives did not hesitate to abandon their earlier stand in order to defend their position on the test ban treaty against the verbal barrage of the Chicoms. The final resolutions of the conference did not mention the treaty. Perhaps, partially in protest against the expulsion of NCNA correspondents from Prague (IOJ Headquarters), the Chicoms boycotted the ICCJ's (International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists -- an IOJ front) "luxury" Mediterranean cruise as a further example of Soviet capitulation to the ways and domands of "imperialism" (the more important example of such behavior on the Soviet side being the test ban teeaty). To make this same point they cited the fact that the conference was to be "concerned only with professional matters" and "devoid of political content." Meanwhile, Khrushchev's son-in-law, Izvestiya's editor, A.Ahdzubei, and other Soviet figures, prominent in the field of journalism, took advantage of the Chicoms' absence and attended the session aboard the Soviet vessel, the Litva.

The most decisive Soviet victory was at the AAPSO Executive Committee Meeting, Nicosia, Cyprus (10-12 September). In the spring at Moshi, the Chicom success seemed to trigger the formation of a rival set of fronts under Chicom control. However, intensive Soviet preparations for the Nicosia meeting paved the way for a successful Soviet come-back and there seems little doubt that the Soviet line won most effective support. The Soviet delegation was supported by observers from East Europe and from international fronts, including the WPC and WIDF. (TASS reported that the Chinese had tried to prevent these observers from attending). Although the agenda had included an item on the association of Latin American countries with AAPSO, there was a conspicuous omission of any reference to the "Three Continent" conference which had recieved the support of the Moshi Conference. It seems likely that, for the time being, this project fell victim to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nicosia certainly dimmed Chicom hopes of reading the Soviets out of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

One indication that the Soviets are trying to press home the advantage gained over the Chicoms at Nicosia is Moscow Radio's new series of programs in its Arabic service describing the aims and activities of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Featuring the importance of and more actively engaging the Soviet affiliates in international organizations' work may well signify a new trend toward reasserting Soviet influence in the fronts. The attendance of the many foreign delegations at the Soviet Trade Union Congress would seem to point in this direction, especially since the Congress highlighted the proper arrangements which should govern the convening of meetings of international organizations.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5

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Reform Program In Iran

The Iranian reform program aims to: increase efficiency and productivity in all fields; break up the archaic agricultural landholdings system; shift to industry some of the four-fifths of the Iranian population now in agriculture; exploit natural resources and raise the national literacy levels. To accomplish these fundamental changes in the tradition-bound social, economic and political life of Iran, attacks are being made on five important sectors.

Land distribution is the most significant and controversial of the reforms. It limits individual private ownership of land to one village (defined as a center with less than 5,000 population) in a country where nearly 50,000 villages are owned by approximately 1,000 families. All land in excess of one village must be either sold to peasants, to the government for resale to the peasants or leased under specific conditions. Nearly two-thirds of the 21 million population are peasants who have traditionally share-cropped the land for one-fifth to four-fifths of the harvest -- the share depended on whether the landlord furnished seed, fertilizer or farm animals.

The new peasant land-owner must join an agricultural cooperative which will guide and assist him in planning and marketing his crops and assume certain of the former landlord's functions until the small owner is self-sufficient. Lack of trained personnel to establish the cooperatives and to plan for current crops may result in a general decline of productivity for the immediate future. Approximately 2,300 cooperatives have been formed to date and approximately 10% of the one-owner village lands have been redistributed.

Payment to the landlords is to be completed within ten years but the peasants are allowed fifteen years to pay off their mortgages. The financial gap is to be partly overcome by permitting landlords to buy shares in government-owned factories.

Industrial reform laws of November 1962 provide for public sale of government-owned factories (the proceeds are to support the land reform program), collective bargaining, and worker profit-sharing. Since Iran's economy is primarily agricultural, the industrial program affects far fewer individuals, although many of these are urban dwellers with greater political leverage and sophistication.

Electoral reform has three main aims: to reduce traditional landlord and government influence in election supervision; to establish a modern voter registration system and to speed up elections. Charges of election rigging following a 1961 election led the Shah to dissolve the Majlis (parliament) and to rule by decree for 2½ years. September 1963 elections of a new Majlis (which reopened October 6) were freer under the new laws

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but not entirely open. Totally without precedent was the election of eight w o m e n.

The Literacy Corps plan is the least controversial of the reforms and is generally well received. It proposes to recruit high school graduates for training and for teaching peasants in rural areas, under army aegis. The first group of some 1500 went out to the villages in April, 1963.

Forest Nationalization, a plan approved in January 1963, is essentially a conservation measure to protect Iranian forests which have suffered uncontrolled depletion for centuries and now cover about 12% of the land.

Public approval of the reforms was demonstrated by a referendum vote in January 1963 which gave the program 5½ million "aye" votes against some 4,000 "nays." The reforms were presented as a total package to be accepted or rejected by public vote. Women were permitted to vote but their votes were not counted -- a compromise with clerical objections that votes for women violated Islamic law.

Financing. The general popularity of the reforms does not assure their implementation. Financing such far-reaching efforts in a country with an average annual family income of $175 is a staggering problem. The cost of land distribution alone has been estimated at some 70 billion rials ($930 million). The factory-share scheme to pay landlords for their former holdings has not proved popular. Receipts from new peasant owners are slow and large expenditures are necessary to establish and equip the farm cooperatives. Iran is turning to all sources for assistance. The USSR, for instance, granted a $38.8 million credit and cooperation program -- the first time any bloc country has done so. US economic assistance to Iran continues at the rate of about $130 million per year.

Opposition to the reforms comes from several groups. The ultra-conservative Shia Moslems and their mullahs (clergy) fear the loss of their considerable power over the poorer class Persian who will benefit most from the reforms. Their exploitation of religious fanaticism led to violent riots in June 1963, protesting women's suffrage and land reform. Government security troops forcibly put down the riot. Nearly 200 were killed and Teheran's bazaar area suffered widespread property damage. The result was a temporary setback for the reform program.

Nomadic tribal groups in the southwest, whose range lands are falling under the land distribution program, are using guerrilla tactics to resist further encroachment. A government order for forced disarmament and the threat of resettlement have brought military clashes. The one million Kurdish

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tribesmen living in Iran are traditionally separatists and resist central government control. If the Barzani Kurds in neighboring Iraq obtain greater autonomy in their fight with Baghdad, the Iranian Kurds might be encouraged to further assert their independence.

Landlords dispossessed of their villages and losing their feudal privileges also claim that reimbursement for their property is insufficient. The government counters that the tax assessment base of the past three years has been used -- if the landlords failed to object to a low tax evalution, they cannot now object to the use of the same evaluation as a purchase price.

Political opposition centers around the National Front party, a loose grouping of educated urban dwellers and intelligentsia who concede the need for reform but object to the Shah's authoritarian methods. Merchants subject to profit-sharing plans and city workers who are chronically underemployed are also drawn into this group. The illegal Tudeh (Communist) Party objects to the whole program because its success will deprive them of their major exploitable issue. The prospects for increased living standards, growth of a middle class and the defeat of illiteracy -- all accomplished under a pro-Western monarchy -- threaten nearly every tenet of communism and weaken its appeal to peoples of underdevloped countries everywhere.

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